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Higher-order areas encompassing lateral and midline frontopari-
etal networks show no activation in either volunteers under deep 
anesthesia or in patients in a “vegetative state.” At the opposite, 
patients in minimally conscious state can show activation of the 
higher-order areas sometimes similar to healthy control subjects 
(Laureys, 2005).
A common finding of studies on both pathological and phar-
macological coma is an impairment in the activity of a widespread 
cortical network, encompassing bilateral frontoparietal associative 
cortices, but not of “lower level” sensory cortices (Baars et al., 2003; 
Alkire and Miller, 2005; Laureys, 2005). As we will see, a decrease 
in regional activation seems not sufficient to loose awareness but 
also requires a functional disconnection within that network and 
with the thalami, in line with a number of current theoretical 
views on consciousness (Tononi, 2004; Dehaene et al., 2006; Seth 
et al., 2006).
Altered stAtes of consciousness
Altered states of consciousness here refer to an alteration in the 
level and content of conscious awareness during to sleep, general 
anesthesia, seizure or coma, and related states. In the latter case, they 
are coined DOC and encompass a spectrum of clinical conditions 
introduction
Functional brain imaging and particularly fMRI and PET is increas-
ingly showing its interest in the diagnosis (Laureys et al., 2000a; 
Hirsch, 2005; Schiff et al., 2005; Phillips et al., 2010) and prognosis 
(Di et al., 2008; Coleman et al., 2009) of patients with disorders 
of consciousness (DOC). Active paradigms are now enabling to 
probe patients’ awareness and communication by identifying 
command following independent of muscle activity (Monti et al., 
2010). However, besides some exceptional cases, in the absence 
of a full understanding of the neural correlates of consciousness, 
even a near-to-normal activation in response to passive stimula-
tion (e.g., auditory, visual, or somatosensory) can be difficult to 
interpret in terms of unequivocal proofs of consciousness. All that 
can be inferred is that a specific brain region is, to some degree, 
still able to activate and process relevant sensory stimuli. Studies on 
pharmacological coma, i.e., general anesthesia, can help us better 
understand residual brain functional integration and perception 
in patients with DOC. Healthy volunteers studied under anesthe-
sia may show residual activation of segregated cortical islands in 
response to external stimuli (auditory, visual, or somatosensory) 
encompassing the brainstem, thalamus, and “low-level” primary 
cortices, similar to findings obtained in unconscious DOC patients. 
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and locked-in syndrome to minimally conscious, vegetative, coma, and brain dead patients. 
Anesthesia-induced loss of consciousness was also shown to correlate with a global decrease 
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a loss of cross-modal interactions between networks. These results suggest that conscious 
awareness critically depends on the functional integrity of thalamo-cortical and cortico-cortical 
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(Boly et al., 2008a) that was not observed in patients in a vegetative/
unresponsive state (Laureys et al., 2002). Compared with healthy 
controls, patients in minimally conscious state had impaired con-
nectivity between sensory cortex and anterior and posterior midline 
cortices (Boly et al., 2008a).
Resting state fMRI studies with pharmacologically induced 
loss of consciousness have shown contrasting results. In a study 
using midazolam sedation (Greicius et al., 2008), independent 
component analysis (McKeown and Sejnowski, 1998) was used to 
isolate sensory-motor, mid-cingulate, and supplementary motor 
networks. At low-sedative dose without loss of consciousness, the 
network was still covering both hemispheres and increased connec-
tivity was found in the mid-cingulate area. These results are in line 
with an fMRI resting state study (Kiviniemi et al., 2005) employing 
correlation analyses showing increased correlation at low-sedative 
dose in “low-level” sensory areas. However, a PET study (White and 
Alkire, 2003) employing higher sedation dose with either halothane 
or isoflurane leading to loss of consciousness demonstrated (using 
psychophysiological interaction analyses) a decreased functional 
connectivity between the thalamus and primary motor cortex, 
and between the thalamus and supplemental motor area. In the 
same study, a structural equation modeling (assessing effective con-
nectivity; McIntosh and Lobaugh, 2004) showed disconnections 
between supplementary motor and thalamic areas and between the 
former and primary motor cortex. A fMRI resting state study using 
sevoflurane anesthesia (again leading to loss of consciousness) and 
a seed-voxel cross-correlation analysis also showed a decreased con-
nectivity of the primary motor cortex (Peltier et al., 2005). In this 
study, the activity of the seed region in the primary motor cortex in 
the awake state correlated with bilateral sensorimotor and supple-
mentary motor areas. When sevoflurane was given upto the point of 
loss of consciousness, the seed exhibited reduced connectivity with 
the opposite hemisphere. At higher even doses of the anesthetic, 
functional connectivity was virtually absent. We recently assessed 
functional connectivity in auditory and visual networks by means 
of both independent component and seed-correlation analyses dur-
ing induced propofol anesthesia using resting state fMRI (Boveroux 
et al., 2010). When comparing deep sedation to wakefulness, no 
significant differences in cortico-cortical and thalamo-cortical con-
nectivity could be identified in early visual and auditory networks. 
On the other hand, we found a linear decrease in cortico-cortical 
connectivity with the level of sedation of “higher-order” associative 
areas. Finally, Alkire et al. (2008a), studied the influence of emo-
tion on memory during light sedation with structural equation 
modeling. During 0.25% sevoflurane anesthesia (a subanesthetic 
dose), the connections between right hippocampus and amygdala 
and between right hippocampus and nucleus basalis of Meynert 
were suppressed, as compared to normal wakefulness.
“HigHer-order” frontopArietAl ActivAtion
A large frontoparietal network encompassing bilateral frontal and 
temporo-parietal associative cortices has its activity commonly 
impaired during altered states of consciousness (Baars et al., 2003; 
Alkire and Miller, 2005; Laureys, 2005) (Figure 1). This network 
can be divided into several parts with distinct functions (Boly et al., 
2008b,c; Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010a). In particular, a distinc-
tion can be made between a network involved in the awareness of 
involving profound disruption in wakefulness and/or awareness 
due to severe brain lesions (Giacino et al., 2002; Laureys et al., 2004; 
Bernat, 2006; Schiff, 2006). The clinical definition of conscious-
ness distinguishes between two components, namely wakefulness 
and awareness (Laureys, 2005). Patients in coma are unconscious 
because they cannot be awakened (i.e., the never open the eyes). 
Following coma, some patients may “awaken” (meaning they open 
the eyes) but remain unaware. This condition is called the “vegeta-
tive state” (Jennett and Plum, 1972) recently renamed “unrespon-
sive wakefulness syndrome” (Laureys et al., 2010).
Minimally conscious state refers to patients who are unable 
to reliably communicate but show reproducible albeit fluctuat-
ing behavioral evidence of awareness (i.e., non-reflex movements 
or command following; Giacino et al., 2002). Locked-in syn-
drome patients (Plum and Posner, 1972) are fully conscious but 
are completely paralyzed except for small movements of the eyes 
or eyelids.
Pharmacologically induced unconscious states are commonly 
named deep sedation or general anesthesia. All sedative anesthetic 
agents do not act on the brain in the same way. They can be sepa-
rated into three main categories: (i) classic anesthetic agents (e.g., 
propofol, midazolam, halothane, isoflurane, or sevoflurane) are 
able to induce graded states of sedation and combine alterations of 
wakefulness and awareness; (ii) dissociative anesthetic agents (e.g., 
ketamine or nitrous oxide), are able to blunt out conscious proc-
esses while maintaining signs of wakefulness; and (iii) minimally 
sedative agents induce graded alterations of wakefulness while pre-
serving several cognitive brain functions (Boveroux et al., 2008). 
At low-sedative doses anesthetic agents may cause a state similar 
to drunkenness and subjects may present an increased sleepiness 
distorted time perception and depersonalization (Alkire et al., 
2008b). Furthermore, they show a reduced response to pain and 
loss of memory. Next, when the anesthetic dose is increased, the 
subject will fail to move in response to commands and is therefore 
considered unconscious. During surgery, higher anesthetic doses 
are used to prevent movement and response to painful stimulation, 
also ensuring stable hemodynamic function.
disconnected islAnds of sensory “low-level” 
corticAl ActivAtion
In response to external stimulation, islands of activation can be 
observed in the brain of patients with DOC (Laureys et al., 2004; 
Laureys, 2005; Boly et al., 2008a; Owen and Coleman, 2008), or 
anesthetized healthy subjects (Alkire and Miller, 2005; Ramani and 
Wardhan, 2008). Few studies looked at the functional connectivity 
between these cortical islands and the rest of the brain. PET H
2
O15 
activation studies on auditory processing in patients with DOC 
using psychophysiological interaction analyses (Friston et al., 1997), 
showed a higher functional connectivity between auditory sensory 
cortex and a widespread network of “higher-order” frontotempo-
roparietal areas in normal volunteers (Laureys et al., 2000a, 2002) 
and in patients in a minimally conscious state (Boly et al., 2004) 
as compared to patients in a vegetative/unresponsive state. Similar 
psychophysiological interaction analyses of noxious processing 
revealed preserved modulation between primary somatosensory 
cortex and a large set of associative areas, again including fron-
toparietal associative areas, in patients in minimally conscious state 
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unresponsive state (Laureys et al., 1999). More recently, fMRI stud-
ies on the default/internal network confirmed a decreased cortico-
cortical connectivity in patients with DOC (Boly et al., 2009; Cauda 
et al., 2009; Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010b) and an absence of con-
nectivity in brain death (Boly et al., 2009) (Figure 2). Paralleling 
clinical experience, a non-linear correlation was found between 
this default/“internal” network connectivity and the level of con-
sciousness ranging from healthy volunteers and pseudocoma/
locked-in syndrome, to minimally conscious, vegetative/unre-
sponsive, and comatose patients (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010b). 
self (the “internal” midline default mode network) encompassing 
precuneus/posterior cingulate, mesas-frontal/anterior cingulate, 
and temporo-parietal cortices (Gusnard and Raichle, 2001; Mason 
et al., 2007) and an “external” more lateral and dorsal frontopa-
rietal network involved in the awareness of environment (Boly 
et al., 2008b). Activities of both internal and external networks 
are anticorrelated.
Functional connectivity studies with PET and psychophysiolog-
ical interaction analyses identified a disturbed cortico- cortical con-
nectivity within the frontoparietal network in patients in  vegetative/
FIguRE 1 | The internal network of a healthy subject awake, under mild 
sedation and after loss of consciousness. The network was extracted 
with ICA. The black and white contour represents a template of the internal 
network extracted from 11 awake healthy subjects with ICA. Yellow and 
orange colors represent the areas which activities positively correlate with 
the time course of the internal network. The green and blue colors 
represent the areas which activities are anticorrelated with activities of 
the internal network, i.e., the external network. The anticorrelation 
disappears during deep sedation. The figure is based on data from 
Boveroux et al. (2010).
FIguRE 2 | The internal network of patients with brain death, coma, 
vegetative state (VS), minimally conscious state (MCS), and Locked-in 
syndrome (LIS). The network was extracted with ICA. The black and white 
contour represents a template of the internal network extracted from 11 
awake healthy subjects with ICA. Yellow and orange colors represent the 
areas which activities positively correlate with the time course of the 
internal network. The figure is based on data from Boly et al. (2009) and 
Vanhaudenhuyse et al. (2010b).
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or content of consciousness, and possibly be related to underly-
ing anatomical connectivity (Vincent et al., 2007; Greicius et al., 
2009), and the other part being more tightly related to the pres-
ence of conscious cognitive processes (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 
2010a,b). fMRI connectivity studies in patients with DOC need 
to deal with major methodological issues (Soddu et al., 2010). 
When studying non-collaborative patients, especially patients that 
show a significantly reduced neuronal activity, the first issue is 
the possible contamination by artifact and noise sources. Major 
confounds in fMRI acquisitions and analyses are movement, pulse, 
and respiration artifacts. Furthermore, patients with pathological 
alterations of consciousness often suffer from severe diffuse brain 
injuries leading to extreme brain atrophy and secondary ex-vacuo 
hydrocephalus (i.e., dilated ventricles) or from major focal lesions 
resulting in a largely deformed brain. This implies that a spatial 
normalization procedure is difficult to apply, and the selection 
of the regions under study becomes difficult and requires visual 
inspection of an expert eye.
In studies on general anesthesia, a potential bias may be that 
most studies use relatively low sedation levels. Indeed, most if 
not all studies use just enough sedative agent to reach uncon-
sciousness. Deeper sedation levels as those used in the operating 
room probably would result in much more profound functional 
cerebral disconnections. The use of classical anesthesia as a model 
for studying human consciousness can also be discussed. Indeed, 
classical sedative anesthetic agents, as all the ones reviewed in the 
present paper, decrease both wakefulness and awareness while 
DOC may present a dissociation between both (e.g., the vegeta-
tive or unresponsive syndrome). Dissociative agents have some 
properties more similar to the latter but also some disadvantages 
related to the induction of confusion and motor agitation mak-
ing their use in a scientific setting more difficult. Further studies 
should investigate brain connectivity changes under these differ-
ent yet challenging dissociative anesthetic agents such as ketamine 
or xenon.
From a methodological point of view, most presented studies rely 
on functional connectivity which measures temporal correlation 
between cerebral activities in distinct brain areas but cannot infer 
causality. Effective connectivity methods which can infer causality 
have been proposed but seldom used in studies on consciousness. 
They suffer from their higher complexity and from the difficulty to 
assess causality from the low pass filtered hemodynamic signal in 
fMRI studies. A more straightforward approach would rely on tran-
scranial magnetic stimulation coupled to electroencephalography 
(TMS–EEG) to infer effective connectivity from the brain response 
to a TMS pulse. This perturbation approach has shown promising 
results in sleep (Massimini et al., 2005) and anesthesia (Ferrarelli 
et al., 2010). Methods specifically developed to measure conscious-
ness based on the information integration theory (Tononi, 2004) 
like causal density (Seth, 2005) also used connectivity information 
but remain difficult to measure (Seth et al., 2008) and have never 
been applied in these contexts. In our view, the upcoming challenges 
are to apply effective connectivity approaches to altered states of 
consciousness aiming to infer causality between brain areas, to 
integrate hemodynamic and electromagnetic information, and 
to explain empirical data with theoretical models using specific 
measures of consciousness.
Furthermore, precuneus connectivity was found to be significantly 
stronger in minimally conscious patients compared to vegetative/
unresponsive state patients, while locked-in syndrome patients’ 
default/”internal” network connectivity was shown not to be sig-
nificantly different from healthy control subjects. Finally, thalamo-
cortical connectivity with the higher-order frontoparietal network 
was only studied in patients in vegetative/unresponsive state with 
H2O
15 PET (Laureys et al., 2000b) where it shown to be severely 
disturbed and recovered near normal modulation after recovery 
of consciousness.
Functional connectivity studies during anesthesia reported 
decreased cortico-cortical connectivity in “internal” (Greicius et al., 
2008; Boveroux et al., 2010) and “external” (Boveroux et al., 2010) 
networks in healthy volunteers during light sedation with either 
midazolam or propofol. During deep sedation with propofol induc-
ing clinical unconsciousness, partially preserved residual functional 
connectivity could be identified both in the internal and external 
networks (Figure 1). Across sedation states, functional connectivity 
strength in key nodes of both networks and in thalamo-cortical 
connectivity with internal and external networks showed a linear 
correlation with decreasing consciousness (Boveroux et al., 2010). 
Finally, anticorrelations between internal and external networks 
also showed a linear trend and could not be identified during loss 
of consciousness.
future directions
In conclusion, PET and fMRI connectivity studies on pathologi-
cal and pharmacological coma emphasize the two different kinds 
of brain function that can be encountered during unconscious-
ness. On one hand, the functional connectivity in “low-level” sen-
sory networks (i.e., auditory, somatosensory, visual, and motor) 
seems independent of the level and content of consciousness. On 
the other hand, the connectivity between these primary cortices 
and “higher-order” associative cortices as well as connectivity 
inside the nodes of the default/“internal” network show a cor-
relation decreasing consciousness in both coma and anesthesia. 
Thalamo-cortical connectivity follows the same distinction with 
preserved connectivity between the thalamus and primary cor-
tices, and impaired connectivity between the thalamus and the 
default/“internal” and perceptual/“external” networks during states 
of altered consciousness.
Even when consciousness vanishes, i.e., in vegetative/unrespon-
sive state or anesthesia, residual functional connectivity can be iden-
tified in both networks. These results are in line with recent findings 
in anesthetized monkey (Vincent et al., 2007), and in humans dur-
ing light and slow wave sleep (Horovitz et al., 2008, 2009). During 
light sleep, the functional connectivity of the default/”internal” 
network is partially preserved, while during slow wave sleep, there 
is a functional disconnection between frontal and parietal nodes 
of the networks. The preservation of functional connectivity in 
the absence of consciousness could be seen as reflecting preserved 
anatomical/structural connections with some degree of basal func-
tional connectivity dissociated from higher cognitive functions as 
they disappear in brain death (Boly et al., 2009).
Taken together, these findings suggest a two-layer view of rest-
ing state fMRI “internal” and “external” network connectivity: one 
part of the connectivity would persist independently of the level 
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